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5/21/79

To: SAC, San Francisco

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From: Director, FBI

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Enclosed for San Francisco is one copy each of a Report of a Staff Investigative Group to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives relating to captioned matter and a copy of Staff testimony before the Committee on 5/15/79. (u)

San Francisco is requested to review the enclosures for any possible information contained therein which may not have previously been known. (u)

Enclosures (2)

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NOTE: Attached hereto is one additional copy of enclosures which are being forwarded to San Francisco. (u)

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THE ASSASSINATION OF REPRESENTATIVE LEO J. RYAN
AND
THE JONESTOWN, GUYANA TRAGEDY
Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee

Tuesday, May 15, 1979

by

George R. Berdes
Staff Consultant

Ivo J. Spalatin
Subcommittee Staff Director

Thomas R. Smeeton
Minority Staff Consultant

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4/11/87 BY 284,125 & 284,126

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Based on your directives, Mr. Chairman, we are reporting today the results of the staff investigation you ordered into the assassination of Representative Leo J. Ryan and the resulting mass suicide/murder at Jonestown, Guyana on November 18, 1978. The horror and extent of that tragedy shocked the world and produced many perplexing questions.

On November 21, 1978, Mr. Chairman, you wrote the Department of State posing 13 specific questions regarding Mr. Ryan's death and the events at Jonestown. That letter also indicated that "In determining what steps might be taken in the wake of this matter, the Committee intends to look into all of the circumstances which might have a bearing on this tragic incident."

Subsequently, you directed a Staff Investigative Group to conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the international relations aspects of those events. The complete report of our six-month fact-finding investigation is before you. In addition, there is also a confidential appendix necessitated by security concerns and the need to protect the confidentiality of sources.

In presenting these findings we recognize that we are the beneficiaries of retrospect on the events which preceded November 18, 1978. In this respect, we have tried to utilize these advantages without falling victim to the pitfalls accompanying them. We have sought to be objective and balanced but not frozen from judgment. In attempting to be fair we have not been timid.

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

As outlined in Chairman Zablocki's mandate to the Staff Investigative Group, the role and performance of the State Department in this matter was the central issue earmarked for investigation.

On the basis of the factual evidence we obtained we render the following findings on that point:

--The U.S. Embassy in Guyana did not demonstrate adequate initiative, sensitive reaction to, and appreciation of progressively mounting indications of highly irregular and illegal activities in Jonestown. The Embassy's one attempt to confront the situation and affect a solution did not occur until June 1978. Essentially embodying what could at best be described as the Embassy's heightened suspicion of problems with People's Temple, the effort was made in the form of a cable (Log 126) to the State Department requesting permission to approach the Guyanese Government and "request that the government exercise normal administrative jurisdiction over the community, particularly to insure that all of its residents are informed and understand that they are subject to the laws and authority of the Government of Guyana***". The State Department, failing to detect any linkage between Log 126 and the then recent defection of Temple member Debbie Blakey and other incidents, rejected the request in a terse cable (Log 130) because such an overture "could be construed by some as U.S. Government interference."

--The Department's negative response to Log 126 had the net effect of reinforcing the Embassy's already cautious attitude in all dealings with the People's Temple. Despite the fact that an affirmative response was anticipated, the Embassy surprisingly made no effort to challenge the Department's negative decision. Equally surprising was the Department's failure to contact the Ambassador and determine what specifically triggered his request. Testimony from Department witnesses indicates that the lack of specificity in Log 126 was the primary reason for the negative response in Log 130. Such specificity (e.g., Blakey defection) was deliberately avoided, according to the Ambassador, because of Privacy Act considerations. The upshot of this exchange was a lamentable breakdown in communication with neither side making any further efforts to discuss or follow up on the matter.

--Absent in the Embassy's dealings with People's Temple were the vital elements of common sense and an honest and healthy skepticism. Despite the acknowledged handicaps under which it worked the Embassy could have exerted sounder overall judgment and a more aggressive

posture. One important result of such an effort would have been more accurate and straightforward reporting on the People's Temple situation which, in turn, could have given the State Department a stronger and wider base on which to draw in briefing Representative Ryan and his staff.

--State Department organization and day-to-day operations created a distinction between its consular activities and its diplomatic responsibilities. Inadequate coordination between those two functions led to a situation in which matters involving People's Temple were regarded almost exclusively as consular. Despite mounting indications that the People's Temple issue was spilling over into the United States-Guyana diplomatic area, the mentality persisted of relegating it to the consular side.

--In the area of crisis management following the tragedy of November 18 the State Department and Embassy performed with distinction. Also commendable was the competent and efficient work of Department of Defense personnel in assisting the wounded and others and returning them to the United States.

--There was a laxness in State Department procedures for distributing certain important documents relative to People's Temple, thereby inhibiting the opportunity for taking appropriate action. Among these was the U.S. Customs Service report on possible gun shipments to Jonestown; the April 10, 1978 affidavit by Yolanda D.A. Crawford, a People's Temple defector, describing beatings and abuses in Jonestown; the affidavits of May and June 1978 by Debbie Blakey, another People's Temple defector, describing suicide rehearsals and other serious charges; and finally the New West Magazine article of August 1, 1977, which exposed Jones. A wider awareness of these and similar materials would have significantly enhanced the State Department's ability to evaluate the situation.

The significance of the State Department's careless procedures for distributing such key documents is best illustrated by reviewing the 1977 Customs Service investigation of reported illegal gun shipments and other contraband to Jonestown. The evidence on that subject warrants the following findings:

--The investigation was begun in February 1977 and was based on an allegation that more than 170 weapons once stored in Ukiah had

been transferred to the People's Temple San Francisco headquarters and then possibly on to Jonestown.

--The investigation was compromised one month after it began, not through an inadvertence on the part of the Customs Service, but when an individual conveyed some information on the matter to Dennis Banks, head of the American Indian Movement in an effort to dissuade Banks from any further contact with Jones. That conversation was apparently taped and word was passed to Jones. Complete details of the investigation's final report were further compromised when a copy of the report was sent to Interpol. From Interpol it was, by normal procedure, shared with the Guyanese police. According to information provided us, Guyanese Police Commissioner C.A. "Skip" Roberts reportedly showed a copy to either Paula Adams or Carolyn Layton, two of Mr. Jones' most trusted aides, one of whom passed the information to Mr. Jones.

--Although the Customs Service investigation was not diluted or diminished in any way, it is clear that it was carried out in an unusually sensitive mode because of what was perceived to be Jim Jones' considerable political influence in San Francisco. Surveillance relating to the investigation was virtually impossible to carry out because of the tight security screen Jones placed around the Geary Street headquarters of People's Temple in San Francisco.

--The investigation was concluded in August-September 1977 after a shipment of crates destined for Jonestown was opened and inspected by the Customs Service in Miami in August 1977. Shortly thereafter a report on the investigation was filed with negative results. Nonetheless, investigators apparently felt enough residual suspicion to send copies of the report to Interpol and the U.S. Department of State "because (the) investigation disclosed allegations that Jones intends to establish a political power base in Guyana, and that he may currently have several hundred firearms in that country..."

--The copy of the Customs Service report was received in the State Department's Office of Munitions Control on September 1, 1977 and on September 6, 1977, a copy was forwarded to the Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Although standard routing procedures provided that a copy should have been sent to the U.S. Embassy in Guyana there is no indication a copy was ever sent. In addition,

only the Guyana desk officer saw the report; none of the more than 26 State Department officials we interviewed saw the report until after November 18, 1978, although one professed "awareness" of it earlier.

Another aspect of the State Department's and the Embassy's performance relative to the Ryan murder and Jonestown tragedy involves the pervasive influence on the entire matter of the Privacy Act, and also to a lesser degree, the Freedom of Information Act. On that issue the following findings are offered:

--Officials within both the State Department and the Embassy clearly tended to confuse the Privacy Act with the Freedom of Information Act thereby inhibiting the comprehensiveness of written reports and exchanges of information. One key Embassy official, for instance, was operating under the mistaken assumption that People's Temple was seeking cables reporting on consular visits to Jonestown under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

--Representative Ryan's legal advisors contended that the State Department's interpretation of the Privacy Act was unreasonably narrow and restrictive, and further felt that fact had ramifications on what the Codel wished to accomplish. Those differences, which began in Washington and continued in Guyana, resulted in somewhat strained relations between the State Department and the Codel.

--The State Department's interpretation of the Privacy Act led them to deny Ryan access to certain information and documents relative to People's Temple. That problem could have been avoided or at least alleviated if Mr. Ryan had followed the Department's advice to obtain a letter from the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs authorizing him such access under an exemption clause in the Act. That exemption provision permits disclosure to any committee of Congress "to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction." Reflecting the State Department's lack of knowledge of the law and its application, it is pertinent to note, however, that on February 28, 1979, the State Department was unaware of the exemption provision in denying to Chairman Zablocki requested information germane to this investigation.

--Prior to the Codel's departure, the U.S. Embassy in Guyana reflected its own acute sensitivity to the Privacy Act by urging that Mr. Ryan be fully informed of the Act's limitations. That sensitivity was reinforced by the Embassy's request that a Department legal expert accompany the Codel, a request denied by State because of travel freeze restrictions and the heavy press of other work.

--Among the Embassy officials interviewed there is almost unanimous agreement that the Privacy Act is complex, difficult to understand, and confusing. Accordingly, they believe that regular guidance is required to guarantee proper implementation.

--Initial State Department guidance on the Privacy Act provided to the U.S. Embassy in Guyana was so highly technical and legalistic that it had little if any practical value, a problem compounded by subsequent communications.

--Given the confusion surrounding the Privacy Act and the lack of practical and understandable guidance, it appears that Embassy consular officers in Guyana found the Act difficult to implement properly.

--Also contributing to those officials' ability to effectively implement the Privacy Act vis-a-vis the People's Temple was the understanding they held that as a religious organization People's Temple merited added protection under the Act. Disregarding for now the question of whether or not People's Temple was a religion, few of the officials knew that the Act's prohibition on maintaining records describing the exercise of First Amendment rights also provides an exemption from mandatory agency disclosure of information pertinent to law enforcement activities. Further, there appeared to be little general awareness among State Department personnel of other exemptions provided in both the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act.

--The legal recourse Jones and People's Temple exercised under the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act to obtain Embassy cables had the chilling effect on Embassy personnel of making their communications to the State Department on People's Temple less candid than they might have otherwise been. Not to be discounted is the strong possibility that, knowing the law and the effect it could produce, Jones used the legal claim actions as a tactic in order to achieve the very effect it did.

--Overall, many State Department officials appeared to be highly aware of the civil and/or criminal penalty provisions of both Acts. That fact reinforced their perceived image of both Acts as threatening and troublesome in that failure to comply could present them with serious personal legal problems. In turn, that thought made them doubly cautious in their dealings with People's Temple.

In concluding this summary of our findings on the performance of the State Department, the following mitigating factors require acknowledgement:

--The Embassy did not have an investigative or judicial function;

--The Embassy tried to abide by U.S. laws as well as strict State Department rules and regulations while simultaneously respecting the hospitality of Guyana; and

--The Embassy's ability to break through the facade and get a realistic and accurate picture of what was happening in Jonestown was severely hampered by the fact that Jones staged a show for selective visitors to Jonestown.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GUYANA

Citing reasons of protocol and their own internal investigation, the Government of Guyana refused to permit the Staff Investigative Group to interview Guyanese Government officials. That fact has resulted in a conspicuous void in our report.

Accordingly, we offer the following incomplete findings:

--There is evidence of a strong working relationship between the People's Temple and some officials of the Government of Guyana, especially in the areas of customs and immigration.

--Support for People's Temple by senior Government of Guyana officials ranged from an ideological compatibility with People's Temple socialist philosophy to repeated charges of the exploitation of a sexual relationship between a People's Temple member closely associated with Jim Jones and a high-ranking government official.

--There is also evidence, incomplete and inconclusive, that unknown officials of the Guyanese Government may have taken action to influence the outcome of the Stoen custody case proceedings in the Guyanese court system.

JIM JONES AND PEOPLE'S TEMPLE

The primary purpose of Chairman Zablocki's charge to us in this investigation pertains to the role and performance of the State Department. What became readily obvious to us, however, was that it was virtually impossible to comprehend and in turn judge the Department's actions without a keen understanding of Jim Jones, his tactics, the motivation of the People's Temple membership, and the historical development of the organization. Therefore, in an effort to offer a full and meaningful context, we present the following findings:

The mental deviations and distortions and the psychological tactics which culminated and were most manifest in the holocaust of Jonestown on November 18 were rooted in Indiana and perfected in California. Who and what was Jim Jones? We believe it is accurate to say he was charismatic; in some respects, in fact, he was a genius in the area of human psychology.

As we have studied him and interviewed those who knew him well and had come under his influence, we have concluded that he was first and foremost a master of mind control. Among the tactics he practiced with engineered precision are the following recognized strategies of brainwashing:

--Isolation from all vestiges of former life, including and especially all sources of information, and substituting himself as the single source of all knowledge, wisdom and information;

--An exacting daily regimen requiring absolute obedience and humility extracted by deception, intimidation, threats, and harassment;

--Physical pressure, ranging from deprivation of food and sleep to the possibility and reality of severe beatings. As a complement to the physical pressures, he exerted mental pressures on his followers which he subsequently relieved in an effort to demonstrate and establish his omnipotent "powers." For example, he inculcated fictional fears which he would eventually counterpoint and dispel and thereby establish himself as a "savior." One of his favorite tactics was to generate and then exploit a sense of guilt for clinging to life's luxuries, for wanting special privileges, and for seeking recognition and reward;

--So-called "struggle meetings" or catharsis sessions in which recalcitrant members were interrogated, required to confess their "wrongdoing," and then punished with alternate harshness and leniency. Interrogation could be gentle and polite, but more often it involved harassment, humiliation, revilement and degradation. Vital to this strategy were two of Jones' favorite techniques. The first involved an exhaustive and detailed record for each member kept on file cards and generated by his vast intelligence network. A member would suddenly be confronted by Jones with knowledge of some action he was unaware had been observed. Jones would stage his "mystic" awareness of that action and then direct the outcome to his desired end. The second technique was to establish in each of his followers a mistrust of everyone else. Consequently, no one dared voice a negative view -- even to the closest family member or friend -- for fear of being turned in. Often as not, trusted aides were directed to test individuals by expressing some comment critical of Jones or the life-style in Jonestown to see if that person would report the incident. The end result was that no one person could trust another. As a result everyone feared expressing even the slightest negative comment. The system was so effective that children turned in their own parents, brothers informed on sisters, and husbands and wives reported on spouses.

Inherent in these practices which Mr. Jones masterfully and regularly employed was his central strategy of "divide and conquer" through which he consolidated his power over people.

In addition to these tactics, however, Mr. Jones regularly used other devices and methods to achieve his ends:

--Requiring People's Temple members to contribute as much as 25 percent of their income and sign over to the People's Temple their properties and other assets;

--At times dictating marriage between unwilling partners and at other times not allowing cohabitation between married couples;

--Undermining and breaking a child's ties with parents. In progressive degrees the child was led to mistrust the parents and become more and more secretive in his actions and evasive to his parent's questions;

--As a symbol of their trust in him, followers were required to

sign statements admitting homosexuality, theft, and other self-incriminating acts; often as not People's Temple members would also sign blank pages which could be filled in later. Depending on Jones' need or objective, such documents were frequently used in attempts to defame defectors;

--Rumor spreading in an attempt to ruin reputations or generally implant disinformation, thereby making the true facts difficult if not impossible to establish;

--Infiltration of groups opposed to People's Temple and surveillance of suspected People's Temple enemies;

--Intense public relations efforts ranging from letter-writing campaigns to attempted control of news media in an effort to influence public opinion with a favorable image of People's Temple; likewise, an aggressive program of seeking out political leaders and other influential members of a community in order to cull their favor and establish identification with them.

In the process of manipulating the control board of this extraordinary system Jones suffered extreme paranoia. One can speculate that while it may have been initially staged, his paranoia ultimately became a self-created Frankenstein that led not only to his fall but the tragic death of more than 900 others, including Representative Leo J. Ryan. His paranoia ranged from "dark unnamed forces," to individuals such as Tim Stoen and other defectors from the People's Temple, to organizations such as the Concerned Relatives group, and ultimately to the U.S. Government in the form of the CIA and the FBI -- all of which he ultimately believed were out to destroy him.

Further, in establishing this analysis of Jim Jones it is worth noting that he apparently had several bisexual perversions. Finally, there is some irony in the fact that although he controlled considerable wealth (estimated at \$12 million), he sought out special privileges but none of the usual trappings of wealth such as fancy cars or expensive houses. In short, Mr. Jones was more interested in ideas than in things. He was not driven by greed for money but for power and control over others. That control continues to be exerted even after his death on the minds of some of his followers. It is graphically illustrated by the suicide of Michael Prokes, one of Jones' closest associates, during a March 13, 1979 press conference

in California in which he defended Jones and cited the achievements of People's Temple and Jonestown.

MOTIVATION OF PEOPLE'S TEMPLE MEMBERS

The tactics and techniques of Jim Jones outlined above found fertile ground and were greatly facilitated because of the background and motivation of those who joined People's Temple. Generalities, of course, are always difficult if not dangerous. However, on the basis of the information which has come to us in the course of this investigation one can draw the following general profile of many who became People's Temple members and followers of Jim Jones:

--Some of the young adults were college graduates out of upper-middle-class backgrounds which provided privilege and even luxury. Their parents were often college-educated professionals or executives. Frequently, their families were active in demonstrations against the Vietnam war, campaigns for racial equality, and other social causes.

--A larger number, especially young blacks, had their roots in the other end of the American social and economic spectrum. The products of poor ghetto neighborhoods and limited education, some had been drug addicts, prostitutes, and street hustlers.

--An even greater percentage were elderly, again predominately black, who had come out of the San Francisco ghetto. They appeared to find in Jim Jones an abiding and protective concern.

--A goodly number of middle-class blacks and whites came out of strong fundamentalist religious family backgrounds and were attracted by what they saw as the evangelical nature of People's Temple.

--By contrast, many of the younger people had little if any religious motivation in joining People's Temple. Rather, they tended to be compelled by humanitarian interests. Altruistic and idealistic, they were impressed by Jones' involvement in social causes and what they saw as the "political sophistication" of People's Temple. To the extent that a religious motivation was involved, it was seen chiefly in terms of Jones' seeming concrete application of Judeo-Christian principles. Over time, the dimension of their motivation was not only nonsectarian but eventually became embodied in the Socialist-Marxist agnostic philosophy which Jones espoused.

PEOPLE'S TEMPLE AS A "CHURCH"

Out of the findings outlined above regarding Jim Jones and members of his People's Temple, emerges one additional finding. It relates to the question of whether or not People's Temple was a "church" in the generally accepted sense of that word. Again, on the basis of testimony and compelling evidence collected in the course of this investigation we offer the following conclusion on that question:

--Although People's Temple may have been a bona fide church in its Indiana and early California origins, it progressively lost that characterization in almost every respect. Rather, by 1972 and following in progressive degrees, it evolved into what could be described as a sociopolitical movement. Under the direction and inspiration of its founder and director and the Marxist-Leninist-Communist philosophy he embraced, People's Temple was in the end a Socialist structure devoted to socialism. Despite that fact, People's Temple continued to enjoy the tax-exempt status it received in 1962 under Internal Revenue Service rules and regulations. The issue of People's Temple's status as a "church" is also significant in connection with First Amendment protections it sought and received. Obviously, the latter issue is a difficult and complex matter beyond the purview of this committee and its investigation.

OPPONENTS AND MEDIA INTIMIDATED, PUBLIC OFFICIALS USED

As part of Jones' constant and pervasive effort to control people and events, the evidence obtained by the Staff Investigative Group established that he persistently intimidated and harassed those who left People's Temple and anyone else, especially the media, whom he felt were opposed to his interests. This clear pattern of intimidation and harassment was reinforced and compounded into success by the widely held belief by People's Temple defectors and opponents, that government officials were friendly toward People's Temple or had in some way been compromised. Consequently, attempts at early efforts to alert the public to the nature of People's Temple's activities were largely ignored and/or rejected.

Typical of some of Jones' tactics to intimidate and harass People's Temple defectors who were actively opposed to him were the

following:

--Undermining of their credibility as witnesses by spreading falsehoods and releasing the so-called "confessions" they had signed while members of People's Temple.

--Fear campaigns generated through break-ins, late night phone calls, and unsigned letters threatening beatings and even death. One such break-in carried out against a couple who had left People's Temple was done with the help of their daughter who remained in the organization.

As a result of such tactics People's Temple defectors were frequently frozen in fear and severely hampered in their efforts to counteract Jones. The problem is illustrated in the following example which points up the desperate lengths to which opponents of People's Temple were driven as well as the degree to which officials in San Francisco appear to have been involved. Afraid to contact any public officials for fear that they were tied in or friendly to Jones, one individual went to the length of writing consumer advocate Ralph Nader because he could not think of anyone else he could trust. The letter to Nader outlined many of the allegations against People's Temple which were later proven true. It also indicated that the letter writer feared for his life. It closed as follows: "If you want to help us, please write in the personal column of the Chronicle to 'Angelo' and sign it Ralph and then we will respond and talk to you."

Rather than do that, Nader sent the letter to the District Attorney's Office in San Francisco. By some means, the letter filtered back to People's Temple and the writer soon thereafter received a threatening phone call that said "We know all about your letter to Angelo."

With respect to Jones' and the People's Temple efforts to stifle the San Francisco media, some of the following methods were used:

--The threat of law suits, extensive letter-writing campaigns, picketing of newspaper offices, break-ins, and threatening phone calls, all of which were aimed at preventing the publication of articles regarded as anti-People's Temple. The end result of these tactics was to make most editors and publishers highly sensitive and cautious regarding such critical stories.

--Encouraging San Francisco merchants and businesses to remove their advertising from "offending" publications. The chief target of such an effort was the New West Magazine immediately prior to its publication in August 1977, of an article critical of Jones. The editors of the magazine persisted and the article is generally credited with breaking Jones' stronghold on San Francisco and led him to go to Guyana immediately before it appeared.

Finally, as to the question of whether or not certain California officials had in fact been compromised by Jones, the Staff Investigative Group believes the evidence is mixed. What is indisputably clear and solidly based on evidence is that many such officials were perceived of by Jones' opponents as extremely friendly to or enthusiastically supportive of Jones, thereby precluding them or their offices from pursuing actions against Jones in an impartial manner. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that Jones had endowed himself with the cloak of official legitimacy through his appointment by Mayor Moscone as Director of the San Francisco Housing Authority. In addition, political figures in San Francisco appear to have been enticed by Jones' ability to turn out hundreds of his followers to attend rallies, conduct mailings, man phone-banks, and otherwise provide support to political election campaigns, including some direct contributions.

Similarly, the media were not immune from Jones' wiles and attempted flatteries. For example, Jones made contributions of various sums totalling \$4,400 to the San Francisco Examiner, the San Francisco Chronicle, and 10 other newspapers to be used as they saw fit in the "defense of a free press." Although the Examiner returned the money to the People's Temple, the management of the Chronicle sent the check to Sigma Delta Chi, the national journalism society, which in turn rejected suggestions that it be returned to People's Temple.

AWARENESS OF DANGER: PREDICTING THE DEGREE OF VIOLENCE

On the questions of whether (a) Representative Ryan had been adequately advised of the potential danger, and (b) how accurately anyone could have predicted the degree of violence employed, the

following findings are offered:

--Representative Ryan was advised on more than one occasion of the possibility of violence inherent in his trip to Jonestown. However, he tended to discount such warnings with the thought that his office as a Congressman would protect him.

--The warnings Mr. Ryan did receive regarding the prospect for violence came chiefly from his own staff and the Concerned Relatives group. When the issue was raised in the State Department briefings prior to the trip, Mr. Ryan did not challenge State's assessment that potential danger was "unlikely."

--No one interviewed by the Staff Investigative Group ever anticipated the degree of violence actually encountered. Many expected that there might be adversarial encounters, arguments, or shouting; the worst anticipated was that someone might "get punched in the mouth."

--From a variety of sources, Representative Ryan and some representatives of the media were cautioned that they were regarded as adversaries of People's Temple and Jones. They were further informed that Jones was paranoid. It is appropriate to note here that Mr. Ryan apparently did not advise anyone in the State Department or the U.S. Embassy in Guyana that one of the purposes of his trip was to help possible defectors leave Jonestown with him on November 18.

Based on available evidence we have reached the following conclusions relative to (a) the likelihood of a People's Temple-Jim Jones conspiracy to kill Representative Ryan, and (b) on the question of whether there was a conspiracy against Mr. Jones perpetrated by the U.S. Government.

CONSPIRACY TO KILL REPRESENTATIVE RYAN?

--The possibility of any prior conspiracy tends to be diminished by the fact that Gordon Lindsay, a reporter whom Mr. Jones regarded as an arch enemy of the People's Temple, was not allowed to enter Jonestown with the Ryan party.

--Still not to be discounted entirely, however, is the possible existence of a contingency conspiracy. In this connection, there are

reports of an "understanding" in Jonestown that if efforts to delude Ryan as to the true conditions at Jonestown failed he would have to be killed, supposedly by arranging for his plane to crash in the jungle after leaving Jonestown. While circumstantial evidence is available on this theory we have not found any hard evidence.

--Providing some moderate credence to the idea of a contingency conspiracy is the fact that the Jonestown mass suicide/murder ritual started before the Port Kaituma assailants returned to confirm the shootings of Representative Ryan and others.

--Also lending some substance to the contingency conspiracy theory are unconfirmed reports that a large shipment of cyanide, used in the mass suicide/murder, arrived in Jonestown two days before Ryan's visit. Also related is the reported statement of a Jonestown survivor that several days before Mr. Ryan arrived in Jonestown he heard Jones say that the Congressman's plane "might fall from the sky."

--In an effort to obtain detailed information on Mr. Ryan's upcoming trip Jones placed a phony defector within the ranks of the Concerned Relatives group in San Francisco one month before the Codel's departure for Guyana. The "defector" was seen back in Jonestown when the Ryan party arrived. The late awareness that the defector was false produced a heightened sense of danger in the minds of some making the trip.

CONSPIRACY AGAINST JIM JONES AND PEOPLE'S TEMPLE?

--Jones idea that there were elements opposed to his views and objectives began in Indiana and were expressed in the adverse reactions he encountered because of his racial integration and other policies. His complaints of opposition increased when the People's Temple moved to California in 1965 but proved unfounded when investigated by police. The mood of Jones' allegations of an anti-People's Temple conspiracy grew darker when the group moved to San Francisco in 1972 with its chief target being the media and unspecified "forces."

--Jones' idea of a U.S. Government plot against him, embodied mainly in the CIA and FBI, took full bloom after he and the vast bulk of People's Temple members moved to Guyana in 1977. Opposition

of the Concerned Relatives group was eventually attributed to CIA backing as were periodic "alerts" he called to protect the People's Temple Jonestown community from mercenaries in the jungle around Jonestown.

--On this question of a possible conspiracy against People's Temple and Jones, Jones' two lawyers, Mark Lane and Charles Garry, offer contradictory opinions.

--Granting the strong likelihood of Jones' paranoia, compounded by his manipulative abilities, Jones staged and exploited the idea of a conspiracy as a means of generating fear in his adherents and thereby gaining further control over them. The tactic also served to keep any opponents on the defensive and even had the apparent effect of sensitizing the U.S. Embassy in Guyana.

--No conclusive evidence is available to indicate that the CIA was acquiring information on Mr. Jones or People's Temple. The FBI's only point of contact with the group involved its review of two complaints that individuals were being lured to Jonestown and held there against their will. When the FBI determined that no criminal violations were involved, the Justice Department forwarded the matter to the State Department.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Although this inquiry's scope did not require investigating allegations that the People's Temple stole or fraudulently used its members' Social Security benefits, some information regarding these charges did surface during the course of the probe that is worth noting.

--At the time of the tragedy on November 18, 1978, a total of 199 Social Security annuitants reportedly lived in Jonestown. Altogether their annuities amounted to approximately \$37,000 per month. It is readily apparent that this income contributed substantially to the maintenance of Jonestown. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is presently conducting a review of its responsibilities and performances in paying benefits to Temple members. In this regard, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has submitted an interim report to the committee. In essence, the

report indicates that to date no wrongdoing on the part of the Temple has been discovered.

--In response to the Social Security Administration's request, U.S. Consul Richard McCoy, during January and May 1978 visits to Jonestown, determined that each annuitant interviewed was receiving and controlling the use of his monthly payment, and that none had assigned their checks to the Temple. However, he also noted that while Jonestown Social Security beneficiaries were heavily influenced to turn over their monthly benefits to the Temple they did so voluntarily.

--Some 656 Social Security checks were found uncashed and undeposited in Jonestown after the November 18 tragedy. According to one State Department official, the vast majority of the approximately \$160,000 in checks recovered in Jonestown were August, September, and October 1978 Social Security checks.

--At last report, 173 Social Security beneficiaries have been positively identified as dead. Eight others are known to have survived. The balance of 18 are still unaccounted for but the presumption is that they are among the unidentified deceased.

FOSTER CHILDREN

Possibly as many as 150 foster children have been alleged to have died in Jonestown during the mass suicide/murder ritual of last November. Senator Alan Cranston's Subcommittee on Child and Human Development is conducting an investigation of these charges with the assistance of the GAO. Preliminary indications are that 12 California foster children may be identified as having died.

The Staff Investigative Group was informed by State Department witnesses that the U.S. Embassy in Guyana was never asked by California welfare officials to check on the welfare and whereabouts of California foster children reportedly living in Jonestown. The U.S. Embassy, however, was aware that some foster children may have been living there and asked the Department of State to determine whether it was legal for such wards of the State to leave the United States. One Department witness stated that he queried appropriate California authorities and was told that court permission was

required to take them out of the State.

FUTURE STATUS OF PEOPLE'S TEMPLE

Although it was beyond the purview of the inquiry as mandated by Chairman Zablocki, the Staff Investigative Group obtained evidence and impressions relative to the possible future status of People's Temple and some related matters which the Group believes are useful to establish for this record.

Accordingly, it is our judgment at this time that one cannot discount the possibility of People's Temple being reconstituted. This belief is based in large measure on the distinction made by surviving People's Temple members between Jim Jones as an individual and what People's Temple represented as an organization. Thus, while some remaining People's Temple members express varying degrees of regret, dismay, and disapproval over what Jim Jones did, they still seem to embrace the principles and objectives which they believe People's Temple sought to achieve.

While the existence of a reported "hit squad" whose purported purpose is to eliminate Jones' staunchest opponents cannot be concretely documented it should not be totally discounted. This group has been described as including some of Jones' most zealous adherents. There is evidence to suggest Jones and some of his key lieutenants discussed and had "understandings" to eliminate various individuals, including national political leaders.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the findings and other elements of our investigation we have formed five recommendations, the complete text of which appears on pages 36 and 37 of the full report. We respectfully submit those for your appropriate consideration.

Finally, we want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, as well as Mr. Broomfield and other members of this Committee for the generous encouragement and help which has been provided to us. It should also be noted that this report is the product of a truly cooperative three-man team effort and reflects our unanimous judgment.

We submit this report to you and the Committee with the hope that it will provide a sound and adequate basis on which the Committee's judgment can now be made on whether any further action is warranted or necessary.