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PATRICK SARSFIELD HALLINAN
Hallinan & Blum
345 Franklin Street
San Francisco, California 94102
Telephone: (415) 861-1151
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
PEOPLES TEMPLE OF THE DISCIPLES OF CHRIST, a nonprofit corporation, JEAN BROWN, and JAMES MCELVANE, Plaintiffs,
v.
TIMOTHY OLIVER STOEN, Defendant.
No. 740531
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
I. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CANNOT BE ISSUED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS.
A. A party seeking the interposition of a court of equity must come into court with clean hands. Where plaintiffs’ conduct means they have unclean hands, a preliminary injunction will be denied. London v. Marco (1951) 103 Cal App2d 450, 453, 229 P2d 401.
B. As defendant’s verified answer makes clear, plaintiffs PEOPLES TEMPLE, BROWN, and McELVANE have come into this court with flagrantly unclean hands.
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1. First, they are aiding and abetting in the disobedience by Jim Jones of a California Superior Court order dated November 18, 1977, which involves the subject matter of this action, i.e., an alleged personal vendetta concerning the custody of John Victor Stoen.
2. Secondly, plaintiffs have unclean hands in that it appears they have knowingly contrived to assert perjury into paragraph VI of the verified complaint. On July 1 and 2, 1978, they contrived a totally false story best calculated to induce a judge to erroneously believe the defendant acquired confidential information concerning the lawsuit filed by Stephen Katsaris. To do so, plaintiffs had to contumaciously manipulate and dupe their attorney.
3. Thirdly, plaintiffs have unclean hands and then it appears they have suppressed evidence which is necessary to the disposition of this case. On July 1 and 2, 1978, they arranged for Carol Stahl, the nominal president of PEOPLES TEMPLE and the only person they were willing to let verify the complaint, to leave the United States and the jurisdiction of this court. It appears they did this to prevent her from being cross-examined at an evidentiary hearing and thereby revealing the perjury in paragraph VI of the complaint.
4. Fourthly, plaintiffs have unclean hands in that they are abusing the judicial process. It appears they have ulterior motives: (a) to divert the attention of the media and the public from the savage and unlawful acts are itemized in the three lawsuits
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filed against them by defendant, (b) to coerce Timothy Stoen to expend his energies and limited funds in defending this sham lawsuit of plaintiffs based on perjured allegations so as to inhibit his prosecuting of the three legitimate lawsuits brought on behalf of truly oppressed victims of PEOPLES TEMPLE; and (c) to introduce as part of the court record a document (Exhibit C-2 of the complaint) which plaintiffs know is totally false and spurious, and which plaintiffs know is so utterly lacking in legal significance that it could not be introduced in either of the two custody proceedings, involving the same child John Victor Stoen, brought in California and Guyana, respectively. None of the foregoing acts of unclean hands are proper in the use of the judicial process.
II. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CANNOT BE ISSUED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ALLEGED SPECIFIC FACTS BUT SIMPLY HEARSAY CONCLUSIONS.
A. Unless a statement which is in the nature of a conclusion is supported by the specific facts or circumstances on which it rests, it is insufficient to sustain an application for an injunction. Willis v. Laridson (1911) 161 Cal 106, 108, 118 P 530. The facts alleged must be so specific that the court can further conclusions drawn by plaintiff were correct. Provident Land Corp. v. Provident Irrigation Dist. (1937) 22 Cal App2d 105, 79 P2d 392. Inferences, generalities, presumptions, and conclusions have no place in a pleading asking for an injunction. Davitt v. American Bakers’ Union (1899) 124 Cal 99, 56 P 175. The
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facts must be so specific that if they were shown to be false, the verifier of the complaint would be subject to an indictment for perjury. Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 CA3d 146, 115 CR 879 (“The availability of criminal sanctions for perjury was calculated to ensure that injunction applications be substantially supported by a truthful factual representation, and made in good faith.”).
B. Clearly, the complaint and declaration filed by plaintiffs herein are totally insufficient as to the specificity of facts. Plaintiffs allege three theories for the removal of Timothy Stoen as attorney on the three complaints already filed by him. (Since there are no facts alleged as to future “soliciting” or “accepting” of professional employment, and no facts alleged as to any specific items of “confidential” information likely to be disclosed in the future, plaintiffs’ complaint herein should be interpreted as one to enjoin defendant from “prosecuting any complaints already filed.”)
The first theory is unlawful “solicitation”. But there is not one fact, not one date, that one conversation put forward as to when any solicitation occurred as to Steven A. Katsaris, Wade and Mabel Medlock, or James Cobb, Jr. As their declarations show, each of these victims of PEOPLES TEMPLE approached Timothy Stoen on their own initiative and requested his help.
The second theory of plaintiffs is that the defendant filed his lawsuits out of a “personal vendetta”. While defendant acknowledges he has animus towards PEOPLES TEMPLE and their savage practices, there is no showing whatever that he acted “solely”
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out of spite, which is what Rule 2-110 of the California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct pertains to. If anything, defendant has shown an extremely objective and non-vindictive attitude towards plaintiffs in light of their provocative threats (see his declaration) that he would be killed and that Jim Jones would commit “the ultimate sacrifice” (i.e. kill John Victor Stoen) if defendant did not back off on his custody proceedings. The best test, of course, in determining whether defendant is acting “solely” out of spite is to review the complaint she drafted on behalf of Katsaris, the Medlocks, and Cobb. The wrongdoing of PEOPLES TEMPLE and Jim Jones were therein supported by allegations of (1) specific facts (2) verified under penalty of perjury (3) by persons in a position to know.
The third and final theory of plaintiffs in seeking this injunction is that defendant misused “confidential” information. For some reason, plaintiffs were unable to come up with anything specific on either Medlocks or Cobb. As to Medlocks, they alleged that defendant “planned, advised and arrange the transfer of” their property. No dates, no facts as to the contents of his advice, no facts as to what acts he took to “arrange” the transfer. As to Cobb, plaintiffs do not allege anything except very generalized conclusion that the allegations of Cobb’s complaint “concern various incidents about which defendant obtained confidential information during the course of his attorney-client relationship with plaintiff PEOPLES TEMPLE.” What incidents? The threats to kill Jim Cobb? The department of “Diversions”?
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The plan to murder 1100 people? For some reason, plaintiffs have chosen not to itemize these “incidents”.
There remains, then, only one conceivable theory under which the plaintiffs may proceed: the alleged misuse of confidential information affecting the Katsaris lawsuit. In paragraph VI of PEOPLES TEMPLE’s complaint the defendant is alleged to have acquired confidential information from Maria Katsaris regarding possible conservatorship proceedings instituted by her father and regarding her having been sexually abused by him. But there is no declaration from Maria Katsaris. She is the only person who could possibly know what she told Timothy Stoen (who denies in his verified declaration in any such conversations took place). The question becomes obvious: is PEOPLES TEMPLE afraid to produce Maria Katsaris and let her testify in court? If so, is it because their complaint does contain perjury in paragraph VI? Is plaintiffs’ decision to use Carol Stahl as the sole verifier for the purpose of providing a colorable defense “hearsay” to end indictment for perjury?
To summarize, plaintiffs have totally failed on any theory to allege specific facts which have been verified by someone in a position to know whether they are true or false. Their application for an injunction should, for this reason alone, be denied.
III. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CANNOT BE ISSUED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS[‘] ULTIMATE CASE IS, IF NOT A SHAM, UTTERLY DOUBTFUL.
A. An injunction cannot be granted where plaintiff’s ultimate right to relief is doubtful. Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc.
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v. Chrysler Motors. Corp. (1967) 255 Cal App2d 300, 305-306, 63 Cal Rptr 148; West v. Lind (1960) 186 Cal App2d 563, 569, 9 Cal Rptr 288.
B. Plaintiffs’ underlying case for damages is utterly doubtful. They cannot obtain damages if they have no theory of a violation of a legal right. The only theory they have available to them, taking a look only at plaintiffs pleadings and construing all ambiguous interpretations in their favor, is paragraph VI. And the failure of plaintiffs to file a declaration by Maria Katsaris verifying those allegations shows a reluctance to let her come forward and testify at a trial on the lawsuit. Furthermore, if the decorations and answer filed on behalf of the defendant are considered, there appears no reasonable possibility that a jury or judge could believe the allegations of paragraph VI. Hence plaintiffs’ ultimate case is, if not a sham, utterly doubtful.
IV. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CANNOT BE ISSUED BECAUSE IT WOULD VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
A. An injunction cannot be granted where it would interfere with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. US Const, Amend 1; Calif Const, Art I, §9; Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-Sectarian Church (1952) 39 Cal2d, 145, 245 O2d 481. The right to be represented in a civil case by counsel of one’s choice is fundamental. The refusal to recognize or allow appearance or representation by such counsel is a denial
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of due process and therefore an act in excess of jurisdiction. US Const, Amend XIV; Calif Const, Art I, §7(a); Witkin, 1 Cal. Proc., 2d, Jurisdiction, §194; See Ex Parte Gordan (1891) 92 C. 478, 28 P. 49.
B. The declarations of Steven A. Katsaris, Wade and Mabel Medlock, and James Cobb state that Timothy Stoen is their choice of counsel and request he not be removed. Katsaris says his interest will be “gravely compromised” if Mr. Stoen were no longer to represent him. He gives his reasons as including the fact that Mr. Stoen is “extremely capable”, and he attaches Stoen’s professional resume and character references. In the injunction of the court would constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of speech of everyone involved, in violation of the Federal and State constitution, and would also constitute a violation of the constitutional rights of Katsaris and the Medlocks and Cobb to the counsel of their constitutional choice.
There is no adequate competing consideration because, inter alia there is no irreparable injury threatened. No specific future acts of “solicitation” or “accepting” of professional employment are alleged by plaintiffs. No specific “confidential” information as to type or source, is alleged as likely to be disclosed. In reality plaintiffs appear to have one name in mind; the removal of Stoen from pending cases as the attorney for the persons claiming to be victimized by them. Even if plaintiffs’ allegations had been more specifically pleaded and even if they were true, they would have an adequate remedy of damages at law, i.e. ascertainable
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damages resulting from the existing lawsuits of Katsaris, Medlocks, and Cobb.
FOR EACH AND ALL OF THE ABOVE REASONS, THE APPLICATION BY PLAINTIFFS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE DENIED.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Patrick Sarsfield Hallinan
Patrick Sarsfield Hallinan
Attorney for Defendant