“Please Tell Us Where We Stand”: Peoples Temple’s Appeals to Prime Minister Forbes Burnham

(Kiana Parker is a 2026 graduate of Macaulay Honors College at John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY). She originally submitted this paper for a History Research and Writing Methods class.

(Kiana is also the compiler and organizer for two research projects for this site: Peoples Temple Contacts with Forbes Burnham and Endorsements of Peoples Temple.

(She may be reached at kianaparker11@gmail.com.)

Introduction

On April 9, 1978, Peoples Temple representative Mike Prokes wrote to Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham with a troubling statement: “We have been told that our letters are not read.” After years of correspondence, Prokes wanted to know whom the Temple should contact so that its letters would actually reach him. He continued, “Please realize that it’s when we stop writing that all will be given up. So for God’s sake tell us who to write to with the assurances the highlights of the subjects will be given to you” (Prokes, April 9, 1978, RYMUR 89-4286, BB-8-k-3; duplicate BB-29-sss-3).

Peoples Temple’s interactions with the Government of Guyana were an important part of the history of Jonestown, although they have received considerably less attention than Jim Jones and the events leading up to November 18, 1978. Beginning in 1973, the organization negotiated with Guyanese officials to develop a communal settlement in the country’s Northwest District. During the following years, its representatives maintained frequent contact with cabinet ministers, regional administrators, and, of course, Prime Minister Forbes Burnham himself. Those dealings would be consequential as the Temple relocated hundreds of Americans to Guyana and encountered difficulties with authorities, including those stemming from allegations of abuse within the church.

When I began organizing the Temple’s contacts with Burnham into chronological charts for the Jonestown Institute, I was especially interested in why its representatives kept writing to the prime minister about matters already being discussed with other Guyanese officials: ministers such as Deputy Prime Minister Ptolemy Reid, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fred Wills, and Minister of Home Affair Vibert Mingo were often directly involved in addressing the Temple’s concerns. What, then, did the organization expect to gain by appealing to Burnham personally?

My research involved going through different sections of the Jonestown Institute’s archives, primarily the FBI-recovered Peoples Temple records, where the relevant material was scattered. I located and compared letters, drafts, copies, and enclosures, including references to communications whose originals were not always available. Some documents appeared more than once, occasionally with different dates, annotations, or intended recipients. Ordering them chronologically, with archival citations and contextual notes, made it easier to distinguish direct contacts from tentative communications and to follow changes in the subjects and tone of the letters.

Admittedly, there are limitations to what this material can tell us. I found numerous Temple letters addressed to Burnham but few surviving replies. Alexander Poster and Fielding McGehee both report that much of the Guyanese government’s Jonestown-related documentation was destroyed in a fire in Georgetown (Poster, “Jonestown,” 310; McGehee, “Jim Jones and the Guyana Government”). As a result, it is much easier to determine what the Temple wanted from Burnham than what he actually gave them in return, or even what he thought. Nevertheless, based on the correspondence I reviewed, I have concluded that Peoples Temple seems to have viewed Burnham’s approval as a potentially more dependable source of security than its relationships with individual ministers. Its representatives repeatedly reminded him of Jonestown’s work in Guyana, their American political contacts, and their commitment to his administration. However, by 1978, they were also becoming less certain about whether Burnham would intervene on their behalf when problems arose. I believe this combination of continued allegiance and repeated requests for reassurance is essential to understanding the Temple’s dealings with the prime minister.

Early Efforts to Establish a Relationship

Peoples Temple’s interest in Guyana preceded the controversies surrounding Jonestown in 1977 and 1978. On October 8, 1973, its board approved a resolution to create a branch church and agricultural mission in the country. According to Rebecca Moore, the Temple considered Guyana attractive partly because of its proximity to the United States and English-speaking population, as well as the government’s socialist direction and interest in agriculture. An advance delegation visited Guyana later that year and work on the settlement began in early 1974 (Moore, “The Politics of Peoples Temple,” 37-38).

American political endorsements were involved from the beginning. In November 1973, U.S. Representatives Don H. Clausen and George Brown sent introductory letters to Burnham on behalf of Jones and the Temple. In addition to describing the church’s humanitarian activities, they emphasized it interracial membership and services to disadvantaged communities. These introductions gave Guyanese authorities an account of the organization from respected American politicians who were familiar with its public-service work and could help reassure them about allowing it to operate in Guyana (Clausen, November 20, 1973, RYMUR 89-4286, D-2-B-8; Brown, November 26, 1973, D-2-B-9).

By January 1975, however, the Temple’s letters had become more explicitly political. In a letter congratulating Burnham on Guyana’s anniversary, Temple attorney Timothy Stoen raised the possibility of Guyanese citizenship or dual citizenship for members. He went further by pledging that they would defend Burnham’s administration, even at the risk of their own lives, if the citizenship arrangement could be made. The letter ended with, “An attack on you will be considered an attack on us” (Stoen, January 20, 1975, RYMUR 89-4286, D-3-A-25c), an unusually strong declaration of personal allegiance from a religious group. Here, the Temple was presenting itself as a potential political ally whose members could become personally invested in maintaining the existing administration, something far more substantial than their general sympathy for Guyana’s socialist policies. Of course, there is no indication in extant Temple files that Burnham accepted such an arrangement. Still, it tells us how early the Temple was attempting to make its continued presence in Guyana useful to the prime minister well before Jonestown became embroiled in the controversies of 1977.

Paula Adams made a somewhat different offer in June 1976 when she proposed using the Temple’s American political connections to organize publicity and rallies on Guyana’s behalf, along with assistance to Guyanese students studying near its California congregations (Adams, late June 1976, RYMUR 89-4286, D-3-A-21a–21c). A few months later, Prokes approached Burnham about a proposed visit by Jones. In his October 18 letter, he explained that “a strong showing of public acceptance of our Bishop would be tremendous help” in raising money for the mission and maintaining political allegiance to Burnham’s government (Prokes, October 18, 1976, RYMUR 89-4286, D-3-A-19a–19b). The request is interesting in that it clarifies why the Temple wanted more than discreet assistance from government ministers. Prokes believed that the resulting recognition would carry political weight in both countries. The Temple evidently saw an advantage in having the prime minister personally associated with Jones, beyond the help it was already receiving from other ministers.

A November 15 scheduling note records that Burnham’s office tentatively arranged an audience for Jones and California Lieutenant Governor Mervyn Dymally on December 29, 1976. The note does not independently confirm that the meeting occurred, but it is one of the comparatively rare records documenting a response through the prime minister’s office rather than another unanswered Temple appeal (Unsigned scheduling note, November 15, 1976, RYMUR 89-4286, D-3-A-10). By this point, the Temple had begun treating this recognition from Burnham as a political asset in its own right. Access to individual officials could help with specific problems, but approval from the prime minister could also reassure other members of the administration that Jonestown was regarded positively by the very top.

What Jonestown Could Offer Guyana

Naturally, Burnham’s government had its own reasons to welcome an American community developing land in the Northwest District. Guyana had gained independence from Britain in 1966 and become a co-operative republic in 1970. The ruling People’s National Congress (PNC) promoted a form of socialism based on self-reliance and co-operative production. As Gareth Curless explains, the PNC’s 1972 development plan set out to reduce unemployment and diversify production, with particular attention given to “extending the developmental reach of the state into the interior” which officials regarded as a potential center for agriculture and other economic activities (Curless, “Co-Operative Citizens?,” 397-400). It is worth mentioning that this went beyond addressing the immediate economic problems, which included declining production and shortages of foreign exchange. Curless maintains that the PNC’s co-operative socialism grew upon Guyana’s colonial history and the government’s desire to reshape the country’s economy after independence. For these reasons, Jonestown’s stated ambitions and promise of bringing workers and equipment to the region would fit both the government’s ideological goals and its practical needs (Curless, 392, 407). Moore observes that a successful American settlement in the hinterland “might demonstrate to the Guyanese the possibilities inherent in such development” (Moore, “The Politics of Peoples Temple,” 39). This was especially relevant at a time when many Guyanese were leaving the country in search of better opportunities.

There is reason to believe that at least some Guyanese officials understood Jonestown in these terms. In a memorandum written in December 1978 – in the aftermath of the tragedy the previous month – American diplomat John Dale Blacken identified Deputy Prime Minister Ptolemy Reid as the decisive figure in the original land arrangement, as he had a longstanding interest in agriculture and national development. Blacken also noted that Guyanese authorities had expected the American settlers to encourage local citizens to remain in Guyana and participate in these projects (Blacken, December 5, 1978, 729-31).

Reid’s involvement deserves attention because he had his own reasons for taking an interest in Jonestown. According to Blacken, Reid was receptive to the Temple’s plans for agriculture and its accounts of racism in the United States. He subsequently became one of its closest allies within the administration. The land arrangement itself was advantageous to Peoples Temple. Moore and McGehee affirm that a formal lease signed in February 1976 granted the organization 3,852 acres for twenty-five years at twenty-five cents per acre, well below the customary rate described by McGehee. Work had already begun before the lease was finalized (Moore, “The Politics of Peoples Temple,” 39; McGehee, “Jim Jones and the Guyana Government”). Alexander Poster gives further attention to Guyana’s longstanding territorial dispute with Venezuela; the presence of American citizens in the disputed border region could discourage a Venezuelan military incursion, since an attack affecting U.S. nationals might draw a response from Washington (Poster, “Jonestown,” 306-307, 313-318). This is a plausible interpretation, especially given the historical importance of the Essequibo dispute to Guyana. However, in the letters I reviewed, Temple representatives more frequently discussed their loyalty to Burnham and the practical services Jonestown could provide than any specific idea of Jonestown acting as a strategic buffer. The government also hoped that Jonestown would become a productive part of the surrounding community. As the settlement expanded, disagreements arose over whether it was fulfilling those obligations. Whether the settlement fulfilled those expectations became a source of disagreement.

Political Connections and the Limits of Jonestown’s Contributions

The Temple continued reminding Burnham of its American contacts even after conditions at Jonestown became more difficult. Following damaging press coverage in California during the summer of 1977, Larry Schacht and Eugene Chaikin informed him that supporters back in the States had offered to defend the church. “We suggested that they write to you,” they explained, “just as a way of letting you know that even where the fires are hottest the thousands who know us have not been burned by them” (Schacht and Chaikin, August 5, 1977, RYMUR 89-4286, D-2-C-34A–34C). The resulting endorsements included letters from Dymally, California state legislators Willie Brown and Art Agnos, and other prominent San Francisco figures. Attorney E. Robert Wallach acknowledged that Chaikin had asked him to prepare a personal appraisal of Peoples Temple. Dymally compared American criticism of the church with press attacks on Guyana and Jamaica, and encouraged Burnham to maintain his backing for the agricultural project (Wallach, August 3, 1977, NN-1-H; Dymally, August 3, 1977, LL-2-e-1–e-2). These were meant to reassure Guyanese leaders that many Americans continued to stand behind Peoples Temple, among them politicians and community leaders who could also speak favorably about Guyana, despite the allegations appearing in the press. Of course, those endorsements did not independently settle the accusations being made against Jones.

Meanwhile, the situation within Guyana was becoming more complicated for reasons that had little to do with American publicity. By the second half of 1977, Jonestown’s rapidly expanding population was placing considerable strain on the community. In an October 3 letter signed by Jones, the Temple acknowledged that it had not achieved agricultural self-sufficiency as quickly as anticipated. The writer blamed the sudden arrival of additional residents, which the Temple associated with hostile publicity and persecution back in the United States (Letter signed Jim Jones, October 3, 1977, RYMUR 89-4286, D-2-C-13). Since Jonestown had originally been described as a community capable of growing much of what its residents needed, this letter was an attempt to account for its slower progress at a time when officials were also raising questions about whether the settlement was fulfilling its responsibilities to nearby communities. A governmental meeting dated October 17, 1977 criticized Jonestown’s failure to employ residents of Port Kaituma. According to the record, “We considered that this was not in keeping with the spirit of integration.” It also addressed the settlement’s school and its obligations under Guyanese education requirements (Guyanese governmental meeting record, October 17, 1977, RYMUR 89-4286, BB-2-lll-1–lll-2). Two days later, a letter addressed to Burnham presented the Temple’s side of the disagreement. It listed the medical personnel, agricultural workers, transportation, and equipment they had offered to the region, along with possible financial donations to the PNC, then complained that “there did not seem to be as much interest in these proposals as there was in our schools” (Unsigned Peoples Temple letter, October 19, 1977, RYMUR 89-4286, D-2-C-9a–9e). Needless to say, Temple representatives appeared to regard their services and political cooperation as grounds for allowing the community considerable control over its own affairs.

Regional authorities, meanwhile, expected more direct participation in local society and compliance with Guyanese institutions and regulations. Particularly, Blacken later recalled a regional commissioner expressing disappointment that Jonestown remained more isolated than originally anticipated. The commissioner was also worried about inadequate customs inspections of goods entering the settlement (Blacken, December 5, 1978, 725-26, 729). Granted, this did not necessarily mean that he opposed Jonestown altogether. But there was clearly a basic conflict over what it meant for Jonestown to contribute to Guyana. The community’s development was certainly attractive to some officials, but the former’s desire for autonomy could undermine the very integration that others had anticipated.

Seeking Burnham’s Protection

By October 1977, the Temple was appealing often to Burnham about matters that threatened its continued operation in Guyana. The most serious involved John Victor Stoen, whose custody had become the subject of a legal dispute between Jones and the child’s parents, former Temple members Tim and Grace Stoen. The case brought up questions about whether Guyanese courts and police would enforce judicial orders affecting Jonestown and whether senior ministers might intervene. In an October 26 letter signed by Jones, the writer reminded Burnham of their past devotion to his administration and referred to possible opposition within the PNC. He implored:

So I ask you – please tell us where we stand. If the opposition to our presence is too great, or if there is a pressure to have us leave so as to enable the government to take the farm over, or if internal party pressures are such that you cannot act – please just let us know the lay of the land. (Letter signed Jim Jones, October 26, 1977, RYMUR 89-4286, D-1-M-8 [6])

Jones was evidently concerned about the possibility that other members of the PNC might be working against the settlement or that Burnham himself might be unable to act because of internal pressures. Such a letter also helps account for why Peoples Temple kept contacting Burnham despite its dealings with Reid, Wills, and Mingo. While those ministers could help resolve particular disputes, the organization appears to have seen the prime minister’s approval as a more dependable guarantee of its continued presence in Guyana. At the same time, it was aware that his position might not prevent disagreements within the administration.

Blacken’s account of the Stoen case adds further context. He recalled that Foreign Minister Fred Wills initially helped the Stoens’ attorney obtain access to the Guyanese judicial system. After warrants were issued against Jones and John Victor Stoen, however, they were not executed. Blacken reported learning confidentially from a court clerk that Reid had asked police not to act. Wills subsequently told Blacken that the matter had been taken out of his hands after Temple representatives convinced Reid that the custody proceedings threatened Jonestown (Blacken, December 5, 1978, 722-24). Based on Blacken’s account, Reid appears to have played an important role in the handling of the warrants. Poster writes that Burnham personally intervened to prevent Jones’ arrest, but the extent of his involvement remains difficult to determine from the letters themselves (Poster, “Jonestown,” 326). The 1979 U.S. House Staff Investigative Group also found evidence of close dealings between Peoples Temple and certain Guyanese officials. However, its findings about possible interference in the Stoen case were described as incomplete and inconclusive (U.S. House of Representatives, The Assassination of Representative Leo J. Ryan, 32-33).

The Temple had reason to believe that political connections could affect its legal position. Whether those arrangements amounted to a consistent policy of protection from Burnham is a different question. The Stoen dispute also made the prime minister a recipient of requests from the opposing side. On January 24, 1978, U.S. Representatives Timothy Wirth and George Miller wrote to Burnham asking for assistance in returning John Victor Stoen to his parents (Wirth and Miller, January 24, 1978, letter to Burnham). Burnham was therefore receiving competing demands from Americans, and cooperation with one group would bring opposition from another in a diplomatic controversy. Maintaining Jonestown was becoming a greater liability than accepting the benefits the Temple had originally promised.

Concessions and Government Authority

Customs and immigration were another recurring problem. In January 1978, Prokes asked Burnham to intervene in the handling of Temple shipments. Having personally dealt with the customs problem, he wrote that “the only way I can see in which it can be resolved it is for us to be given a blanket concession on personal and household effects.” He also wanted customs personnel instructed to release shipments promptly without further delays (Prokes, January 11, 1978, RYMUR 89-4286, BB-29-rrr-2). Sharon Amos, who served on the Temple’s administrative staff in Georgetown, followed on January 17 with a more detailed request in which she framed these customs exemptions as something the Temple deserved because of its contributions: “In the past foreign companies, who exploit Guyana’s resources and labor, were given concessions, so surely a productive contributing cooperative that will be loyal to the end, can be given concessions also” (Amos, January 17, 1978, RYMUR 89-4286, D-2-C-2D). Her comparison was consistent with the PNC’s socialist language and criticism of foreign economic exploitation, presenting Jonestown as precisely the kind of enterprise the government ought to encourage.

There is evidence that some preferential treatment occurred. The House Staff Investigative Group found that the Temple enjoyed a “special privileged status” in customs dealings and that certain immigration procedures had been compromised to its advantage. The investigators also acknowledged that they could not fully examine the matter because Guyanese officials declined to participate in their investigation (U.S. House of Representatives, 32-33). Blacken, on the other hand, had heard of a general duty-free agreement being obtained but could not substantiate it (Blacken, December 5, 1978, 730). Neither account allows every concession to be traced directly to Burnham, and the continuing complaints demonstrate that any received evidently did not eliminate the problems the Temple was encountering.

In March 1978, Amos made another attempt. Referring to the Stoen case, medical licensing, and Jonestown’s school, she stated:

“If we could get certain things behind us such as the John Victor [Stoen] case, the problem of having our doctor licensed, and the problem of having our school fully recognized, we could branch out and every dime could go into the economy in a direct manner, through goods and services and through other cooperatives and facilities that Guyana is undertaking” (Amos, March 3, 1978, RYMUR 89-4286, BB-2-xx-1).

Here, the Temple maintained that resolving these matters would allow Jonestown to devote more resources to Guyana. By this point, many of its letters were asking the administration to remove legal or procedural obstacles that the organization believed were preventing it from operating as intended.

There was a certain contradiction in this position. Jonestown was supposed to serve as an example of productive communal life and cooperative labor, yet its representatives wanted freedom from some of the laws and procedures ordinarily governing other people in Guyana. McGehee has argued that the Temple received significant concessions involving its school and the medical qualifications of Larry Schacht, allowing the community unusual autonomy in its operations (McGehee, “Jim Jones and the Guyana Government”). These were affairs that the Temple regarded as essential to running Jonestown according to its own preferences, which helps us understand why it continued to pursue those privileges so aggressively.

Uncertainty About Burnham’s Protection

By the spring of 1978, the Temple was expressing more concern about where Burnham stood. On March 18, Prokes asked whether the abrupt departure of Fred Wills from the cabinet signaled a change in the direction of the government and referred to conflicting accounts about Burnham’s attitude toward Peoples Temple (Prokes, March 18, 1978, RYMUR 89-4286, D-3-A-7–A-8). The concern was understandable. Wills had been one of the principal ministers handling the Temple’s affairs, and his departure created the possibility that existing understandings would not continue under a new minister. After all, cabinet members could resign or be replaced, whereas Burnham had remained prime minister throughout the Temple’s years in Guyana. The organization sought his approval as a more lasting guarantee, especially as its problems with other authorities became more serious. But it was also unclear how much help the prime minister was actually prepared to give.

On April 3, Prokes reported that Jones had traveled to Georgetown incognito because “we could get no written assurances from you that Jim would not be arrested” (Prokes, April 3, 1978, RYMUR 89-4286, BB-29-f-1). Considering the Temple’s earlier claims of receiving help from senior Guyanese figures, this was an important admission. Its representatives were obviously unwilling to rely on their personal contacts or previous expressions of goodwill. Although the letter does not tell us whether Burnham had deliberately refused such an assurance, the Temple was clearly dissatisfied with its position. Prokes’ April 9 complaint, quoted at the beginning of this article, brought that insecurity back to the question of whether those communications were ever reaching their intended recipient. In May, Burnham received further pressure from the Concerned Relatives, a group of former Temple members and relatives worried about the welfare of people at Jonestown. Their petition recalled an earlier appeal to him as “the one person in the world with power” over Jones and requested an investigation of alleged abuses, including restrictions preventing residents from leaving the settlement (Concerned Relatives, petition to Burnham, May 10, 1978, §6). Interestingly, the Concerned Relatives seemed to share the Temple’s belief that Burnham was the person best positioned to change the situation at Jonestown.

Meanwhile, Temple representatives kept reminding Burnham of the benefits they claimed to provide his administration. In September 1978, an unsigned letter informed him that American newspaper publisher Carlton Goodlett would speak favorably about Jonestown and Guyana following his visit. The writer predicted that Goodlett’s advocacy would “erode the opposition’s support among progressive blacks and other minorities in the U.S., and will enhance and increase the respect, support, and recognition of yourself and the leadership of the PNC” (Unsigned Temple letter, September 7, 1978, RYMUR 89-4286, D-3-A-1b). More than two years after Paula Adams offered to use the Temple’s American contacts on Guyana’s behalf, its representatives were still making similar promises. On October 22, Sharon Amos informed Burnham of journalists’ claims that Guyana had adopted a hands-off policy toward Peoples Temple and that American authorities were pressuring the country to expel the organization (Amos, October 22, 1978, Serial 1894-4, FD-302, 21-22). Less than a month later, on November 18, Congressman Leo Ryan, three journalists, and a Temple defector were murdered at Port Kaituma, while Jones directed the mass killing of more than 900 people at Jonestown.

Conclusion

My research originally started solely as a way to identify and organize Peoples Temple’s contacts with Forbes Burnham, but reviewing these documents together raised a larger question about the organization’s position in Guyana and what it hoped to gain from the prime minister. During its early years in Guyana, representatives offered their allegiance to his administration and discussed what the community could accomplish through agriculture and its American contacts. As legal disputes and administrative problems became more serious, they increasingly wanted his personal intervention. Guyana too had reasons for accepting Jonestown, since it appeared compatible with the government’s efforts regarding agriculture and economic activity. Some authorities were receptive to the project and helped it operate, whereas others were preoccupied with its isolation and obligations to nearby communities. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that the Temple’s constant pledges to Burnham did not translate into confidence that Burnham would always protect it. They continuously laid out Jonestown’s value to Guyana even as they questioned whether he was receiving their letters, whether he would take action, whether Jones might be arrested, and whether the government could eventually force the community to leave.

I do not believe the remaining documentation allows us to determine definitively who was manipulating whom, or how Burnham personally weighed the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a relationship with Peoples Temple. It goes without saying, however, that it does allow us to understand how the Temple attempted to secure a position for itself in Guyana, why it continued appealing to the prime minister, and how the assistance it received coexisted with major difficulties despite having friends in high office. Ultimately, I think the volume of letters addressed to Burnham is less informative on its own than the subjects they came to discuss. Peoples Temple spent years trying to persuade the prime minister that it was a loyal and valuable ally worth protecting. But by 1978, its representatives were still writing to him for the same reasons, with much less confidence that his protection would be enough to secure Jonestown’s future.

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